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Abstract 
The introduction of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) in Australia 
highlights a trend in policy towards marketising social care services. This paper analyses 
the effects of marketisation on service delivery by discussing its impact on organisations, 
workers and service users. In a marketised system, agencies that deliver care have been 
forced into a competitive market and have adopted principles of New Public Management 
in social service delivery as a way of becoming more competitive. This approach has 
intensified work processes within the sector, contributing to erosion of professional 
identity, poor working environments and poor-quality care services. The NDIS has 
introduced personalised care budgets as a vehicle for providing disability services in a 
competitive open market. The scheme propounds empowerment, choice and control for 
people with disabilities while remaining grounded in neoliberal economic ideals. 
Amongst various points-of-view that defend the benefits of marketising disability care, 
this paper discusses the way such policies have in fact, created tension in the disability 
sector, promoted poor working conditions and contributed to poor quality care provision. 
Despite the rhetoric that offers participants choice and control under the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) (the Australian Government’s key social policy 
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response to supporting people with disability) this essay seeks to critically analyse 
whether the scheme can truly offer empowerment and promote social justice for 
Australians living with disability.  
Neoliberalism and Marketisation in Social Policy 
Over the last thirty years, public policy and social welfare in Australia has shifted away 
from a public welfare state towards a marketised model of service delivery (Carey & 
Dickinson, 2017). This change corresponds with the rise of neoliberalism as a political 
and economic ideology in the 1970s-1980s. This approach is characterised by principles 
of leadership that promote free-markets as a way to regulate a capitalist economy and 
focuses on market-oriented governance and economic rationalism (Spies-Butcher, 2014). 
Neoliberalism emerged as a response to economic crisis as a way for governments to 
reduce public spending on welfare in favour of more privatised, market-based ways of 
delivering social policy and shifting social welfare responsibility from the public to the 
private sector (Abramovitz, 2019). Neoliberalism argues that individual freedom is 
maximised by limiting the involvement of government in regulating a market and hence 
favours individualised, rather that collectivist approaches to social policy (Abramovitz, 
2019).  
In the 1980s the Australian government began to shift provision of social care from the 
public sector to the not-for-profit (NFP) sector by offering tenders for government 
contracts (Baines, Charlesworth, Turner & O'Neill, 2014). In this competitive process, 
agencies were required to focus on efficiency, cost-cutting and outcome measures in order 
to compete within the market (Cunningham, et al., 2017). This offered the NFP sector an 
enormous opportunity for growth but also required social care providers to adopt new 
managerial models such as New Public Management in their pursuit of efficiency and 
effectiveness (Baines et al., 2014). New Public Management emphasises the need for 
accountability and efficiency in the work process with a focus on quantifying outcome 
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measures (Baines et al., 2014). The impact of these policies and models has had a 
profound effect on the disability sector and has put a strain on service delivery (Onyx, 
Cham & Dalton, 2016).  
 
Indeed, Australia has followed an international trend to integrate human rights with 
economic policy that uses markets to deliver social services (Foster, M., Henman, P., 
Tilse, C., Fleming, J., Allen, S., & Harrington, R., 2016). The rise in this international 
trend has been a reaction to competing economic and social pressures in industrialised 
countries and dovetails with a neoliberal economic agenda that asserts that ‘consumer 
sovereignty’ will produce better services at lower prices (Macdonald, 2017; Onyx, Cham 
& Dalton, 2016). Spies-Butcher states that in Australia, governments have introduced 
marketisation as a tool to “ensure efficiency, while aligning incentives to the social good 
and ensuring equitable distribution of funding through public spending” (Spies-Butcher, 
2014, p. 191). This paper aims to explore how this move towards adopting markets in 
social care provision has had significant effects on social care providers, staff and service 
users. 
The NDIS market  
In recent years, Australia has introduced a reform in social policy and funding of 
disability support services known as the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). 
At the heart of the scheme is a shift towards personalised funding (Carey, Malbon, 
Reeders & Llewellyn, 2017) where service providers (both for-profit and not-for-profit) 
compete within an open market for funds held in individual insurance packages (Fawcett 
& Plath, 2014). When the NDIS is fully rolled out across Australia, funding in the 
disability sector is planned to increase from $8 Billion to $22 billion and is expected to 
support 475,000 participants (Gurd et al., 2018). The NDIS is a scheme that aims to offer 
three tiers of support:   
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1) Insurance for all Australians against significant disability.  
2) A standardised approach to assessment for support needs for people with significant 
and ongoing disabilities and individualised funding packages to purchase services.  
3) Information and referral for people who are affected by disability but are not eligible 
for an individualised budget (Fawcett & Plath, 2014).  
International Context 
The NDIS closely follows international trends towards individualised funding, ‘consumer 
directed care’ and personalisation (Carey & Dickinson, 2017). In other countries, 
including the Netherlands, Canada, Belgium, France, Austria, Finland, Sweden and 
Germany we have seen various forms of personalised funding policies and the use of 
public sector markets to provide social care services (Dickinson, Needham & Sullivan, 
2014). This trend towards individualised funding is, in part, a reaction to the idea that 
universal funding approaches do not adequately address the diversity of needs of people 
living with disability. In the case of the NDIS, the Australian Productivity Commission 
saw the previous block-funded disability care system as a “piecemeal and inequitable 
system” (Carey et al., 2017, p. 3) that was disempowering for people living with 
disability. The NDIS is in some ways unique compared to other international schemes 
due to its vast geographic coverage (Carey & Dickinson, 2017), as well as its all-
encompassing characteristics in the sector. In other countries, participants have the option 
to opt-in to individualised payments. However, the NDIS has now encompassed the 
whole provision of disability services in Australia (Fawcett & Plath, 2014). These 
distinctions have led some researchers to assert that “the NDIS is one of the most 
ambitious personalised funding schemes in the world” (Carey et al., 2017, p. 9). 
Such a scheme requires “new practices that often demand fundamental system and 
organisational change” (Gurd et al., 2018, p. 133). Architects of the scheme have 
highlighted the benefits of markets that encourage innovation in the sector to address 
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issues that arise (Carey & Matthews, 2017). However, Green and Mears (2014) point out 
that such innovation requires significant capital and investment that can be a challenge 
for providers given the nature of government funding. Under the NDIS, providers are 
paid in retrospect for services and prior to the NDIS roll out, government funding covered 
approximately 70 per cent of service provision, requiring agencies to return any surplus. 
In such climates it is difficult for providers to build investment capital to promote 
innovative growth in the sector (Green & Mears, 2014).  
Economics and Human Rights 
In 1986 the Australian Disability Services Act recognised disability as a social issue that 
required structural changes to address marginalisation and the Australian National 
Disability Strategy 2010-2020 committed to improving life for people with disabilities 
through a unified national approach (Gurd et al., 2018). A social model of disability posits 
that “people with impairments are disabled by socially constructed oppressive barriers” 
(Fawcett & Plath, 2014, p. 175). Proponents of individualised funding and personalisation 
see the NDIS as an opportunity to break down such barriers and seek empowerment for 
people with disabilities. Supporters of the scheme profess that personalised budgets move 
away from a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to funding and offer consumers choice and 
control over service delivery (Carey et al., 2017). In this way people with disabilities are 
positioned as actively purchasing services, rather than being passive recipients of services 
(Carey et al., 2017). In other parts of the world an alternate label for such systems is ‘cash 
for care’ (Macdonald & Charlesworth, 2016). This label highlights the shift from 
providing social care within a rights-based, empowerment framework, to viewing social 
policy within a framework of economics. Given the economic focus of the NDIS, a 
critical observer questions whether the scheme will challenge existing, disabling social 
structures in society, or whether it will merely operate as a veneer of inclusivity (Fawcett 
& Plath, 2014). 
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Personalised funding has become popular because it knits together ideals from a 
neoliberal economic perspective as well as a human rights perspective (Needham & 
Dickinson, 2018). In designing the NDIS, the government and policy-makers have sought 
to embrace key elements of neoliberal economics while trying to hold on to a commitment 
to address inequality (Spies-Butcher, 2014). The NDIS raises complex questions about 
theoretical underpinnings of policy making and bears the question whether markets are 
an appropriate vehicle to deliver social policy (Miller & Hayward, 2017). Critics have 
argued that the NDIS has framed disability care as an “efficient investment in social 
insurance” (Miller & Hayward, 2017, p. 130) rather than promoting self-determination 
for people living with disability; and that marketising social care frames disability as an 
economic issue rather than a social policy and human rights issue (Fawcett & Plath, 
2014).  
Eligibility and ‘Reasonable and Necessary’ Services 
Within marketised frameworks, disability welfare principles are contested and political. 
The international trend towards integrating human rights with economic policy has seen 
an increase in welfare recipients needing to earn their right to access support (Foster et 
al., 2016). Under the NDIS, standardised assessments are conducted to determine the 
level of funding and resources that are allocated to support each participant (Fawcett & 
Plath, 2014). Within the first three months of operation, the average cost of services per 
person was 30 per cent higher than initially anticipated (Foster et al., 2016). In a system 
grounded in neoliberal values, it is likely that eligibility will be tightly regulated, and 
increasingly so, as the scheme progresses (Foster et al., 2016). 
The National Disability Insurance Agency makes decisions about what supports and 
funding are ‘reasonable and necessary’ for each NDIS participant based upon an 
assessment of the functional impact of their disability (NDIS, n.d.-b). Prioritisation and 
allocation based on what is ‘reasonable and necessary’ means that the support needs of a 
participant are balanced against cost and sustainability. For example, if an individual with 
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high needs wishes to live at home with in-home support rather than moving into a 
supported-living facility, an NDIS planner will decide whether this is cost-effective and 
will allocate funds accordingly. In a block-funded model of support, agencies holding 
government funds would have some discretion over how to allocate funds to best support 
the participant. However, a ‘reasonable and necessary’ approach places these decisions 
about allocation in the hands of government bureaucrats rather than in the hands of 
specialised service providers. While advocates of NDIS would argue that this is more 
equitable, it can also be seen as a form of markets being used as a tool for government 
control.  
NDIS and Economic Austerity 
By funding reasonable and necessary supports, the NDIS seeks to open up more 
workplace engagement for people with disabilities and their carers. In this way, the 
scheme is designed to be partially ‘self-funding’ (Miller & Hayward, 2017). Moreover, 
despite a long-standing deficit in the federal budget, the Australian government 
committed to almost doubling funding to the disability sector by rolling out the NDIS. 
Hence, critics argue that “it is distinctly possible that the delivery of a new, fabulous 
service for those with disabilities - the most important social policy innovation for a 
generation - may in fact not be the main point of the NDIS, nor indeed what it actually 
delivers” (Miller & Hayward, 2017, p. 145). Indeed, the NDIS can be seen as a scheme 
that allows the Australian government to stimulate a job market in the disability sector, 
having lost ground in employment opportunities in the manufacturing industry (Miller & 
Hayward, 2017). Furthermore, as this paper will go on to explain, in such an economic 
climate, agencies are forced to adopt managerialist leadership approaches to respond to 
the increasing demands of a competitive market which contributes to reduced quality of 
care services (Baines et al., 2014). From this point of view, the NDIS appears less focused 
on providing quality care for people with disabilities, and more focused on achieving 
economic outcomes by stimulating a market for employment. 
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Regulating the market 
The NDIS completed its trial period in July 2016 and is now in the process of a full roll-
out across Australia (NDIS, n.d.-a). As such, we are witnessing a market develop that has 
been “created, funded and regulated by government to fulfill a public purpose” (Carey,  
Dickinson, Malbon & Reeders, 2018, p. 388). While designing the scheme in 2011, the 
Productivity Commission highlighted the need for the market to be regulated in order to 
develop national standards that apply to all providers, encourage spread of best practice 
across the sector, provide participants with information about the quality of service 
providers, establish an innovation fund to support creative industry growth and monitor 
compliance (Carey et al., 2018). Such regulation would require government to work 
closely with industry, providers and participants to develop knowledge about how the 
market is operating and whether it is meeting the needs of consumers. However, almost 
twelve months after full roll out commenced there is still no regulatory framework for the 
market and ambiguity exists about government’s role in regulating the market (Carey et 
al., 2018). Carey et al. (2018) speculate that this is because Australia is idealistically 
committed to the idea of a deregulated disability market that will find its own innovative 
solutions to issues as they emerge. However, the issue of regulation is significant because 
there is currently no framework that specifies who will be responsible for identifying and 
addressing issues as they arise (Carey et al., 2018). The NDIS has been described as “like 
a plane that took off before it had been fully built and is being completed while it is in the 
air” (Whalan, Acton & Harmer, 2014, p. 7). Without a sufficient regulatory framework, 
it is a real possibility that the market will serve to extend existing inequities and leave 
complex issues unaddressed. The implementation of the NDIS within a largely 
unregulated market, leaves government and policy makers somewhat unaccountable to 
address issues that arise, and puts pressure on the disability sector to produce innovative 
solutions to social issues.  
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Impact on Organisations 
Competing values 
Within the care industry, marketisation of disability services has significantly affected 
the way care providers are required to conceptualise their delivery of services. One 
confronting issue for service providers has been having to manage competing values 
between a caring logic and marketised logic (Gurd, Lim & Schuler, 2018). This tension 
can be linked to a sense of ‘mission drift’ where organisations find it difficult to reconcile 
their core values with market-driven service delivery; especially in the NFP sector 
(Clancey & Westcott, 2017). NFP workplaces attract and retain workers who uphold the 
values and mission statement of the organisation (Venter et al. 2017) and a sense of 
mission drift can erode professional identity (Baines et al., 2014). Further, research 
confirms that social justice oriented practice has been reduced or removed through the 
introduction of New Public Management in organisations (Ross, 2011), and has thus 
contributed to the weakening of the ethos of care and quality service provision in 
organisations.  
To compete within a market, providers need to have an attractive range of services at 
competitive prices. To achieve this, they need to re-educate staff with a combination of 
both caring and economic logic (Gurd et al., 2018). In care work, this logic intersects with 
gendered stereotypes and workers often end up providing many additional hours of 
unpaid work in order to provide quality care (Baines, 2016) and agencies begin to rely on 
unpaid work to accomplish their goals and make their service more attractive. The 
competitive nature of a market of social care leads to strict timeframes and quantifiable 
outcomes that leave agency, worker and client feeling powerless (Baines, 2016). 
Competition, Work-Intensification and De-Skilling 
Further to this, current funding contexts have generated a climate of competition and 
‘survival’ in non-government organisations. Competitive markets have contributed to the 
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closing of small NFP providers or forced them to amalgamate with larger organisations 
as their only option to survive within a market (Clancey & Westcott, 2017). The effect of 
this restructuring of social care has led to a loss of specialised services and discouraged 
collaboration within the sector (Onyx et al., 2016). In a marketised social welfare system, 
we also see skills and workplaces that focus on social justice traditions being removed or 
reduced as these outcomes are difficult to quantify (Baines, 2016). With the closure of 
many small, grass-roots organisations, the sector has lost the knowledge and specialised 
skills that these small organisations grew through their commitment to community-
informed development and advocacy (Green and Mears, 2014).  
Impact on Workers  
Care Deficit 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has recognised 
a worldwide ‘care deficit’ in which we see a growing population of people who need care, 
alongside a dwindling number of people who provide care (Baines, 2016). Factors that 
contribute to this deficit are: more women moving out of unpaid care work into the 
workforce, a growing population of people who require care, and a reaction by welfare 
states to austerity policies and personalisation of services (Baines, 2016). 
Beginning in the 1970s, the feminist movement encouraged payment for caring roles, as 
women increasingly joined the labour force and were less able to provide informal, unpaid 
care (Macdonald, 2017). In more recent times, we have seen a growing demand on the 
care sector, as populations age and as people with high care needs live longer (Miller & 
Hayward, 2017). This demand in the care workforce is a major challenge to policy makers 
(Gurd et al., 2018). Neoliberal ideas about competition and choice, coupled with 
advocacy for choice and control by disability rights activists have advanced cash-for-care 
systems and marketisation of services (Macdonald, 2017). Welfare funding cuts also 
mean that people who require care typically present to services for support in later stages 
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of need and hence their needs are often more complex (Baines, 2016). All these factors 
contribute to the ‘care deficit’ along with intensification of workloads in the care sector 
(Baines, 2016).  
Working Conditions 
Intensification of workloads across the care sector has had a detrimental impact on 
working conditions. In 2011, a Productivity Commission report regarding the NDIS 
specified the need to increase workplace conditions for disability care workers in order 
to attract more people to the sector. Then in 2017, a further Productivity Commission 
report specified the need for growth in the disability support workforce but was virtually 
silent regarding work conditions (Macdonald, 2017). As the welfare market has become 
more competitive, there is little to no resources for training opportunities, supervision or 
investment in staff career paths which, de-incentivises skill development (Green & 
Mears, 2014), erodes professional identity and contributes to deskilling of the workforce 
(Baines et al., 2014). As services become more generalised, there is also an increased 
need for workers to support people with more diverse and complex needs for the same 
low wages, further reducing service quality (Green & Mears, 2014). Further to this, 
increasing competitiveness calls for increased flexibility as clients pick and choose 
between providers and so marketisation has led to increasing casualisation of the 
workforce (Green & Mears, 2014). 
Studies have increasingly demonstrated that major drivers for quality care are low staff-
user ratios, well-qualified, experienced staff and appropriate wages to attract and retain 
employees; however, marketisation has seen the very opposite of this occur under the 
NDIS (Miller & Hayward, 2017). Despite the argument of care markets offering more 
flexibility, choice and control to customers, it is highly likely that customers actually 
receive service of less quality, as the workforce is increasingly built on low-paid, 
deskilled, time-poor supports where workers contend with increasingly insecure working 
conditions (Macdonald, 2017). 
  
 
 
 
12 
Economies of care  
Baines (2016) describes different ‘economies of care’ in this climate of marketised social 
care services. Issues relating to the formal economy of care have been addressed above, 
however, increasingly care is being provided by a rapidly growing informal workforce. 
Additionally, as the care deficit grows, more and more service users are resorting to 
paying from their own savings to subsidise government-funded care and this often takes 
the form of payment to informal workers. In cash-for-care systems such as the NDIS 
where people are able to ‘self-manage’ their funds, participants are able to negotiate the 
rate of pay and conditions of the people they employ to provide care (NDIS, 2019). In 
such cases, it remains the responsibility of self-managing participants to ensure rates of 
pay are in line with relevant awards (NDIS, 2019). However, the NDIS sets only 
maximum benchmark rates of pay and provides little protection or regulation for workers 
employed directly by self-managed participants (Macdonald & Charlesworth, 2016). 
With increased reliance on an informal economy of care, workers may opt to work at 
lower rates and are generally highly compliant and highly exploitable due to fear of 
repercussions of losing income and absence of protection by industry regulations (Baines, 
2016).  
Another important factor to consider within this context is Australian immigration 
policies and the accessibility and tight control of working visas for people migrating to 
Australia. Such policies, combined with cash-for-care schemes, have led to an ‘off the 
books’ care market that has developed a workforce vulnerable to exploitation (Miller & 
Hayward, 2017). Miller and Hayward (2017) refer to this workforce as the ‘migrant 
precariat’. The majority of this workforce are migrant women who are not protected by 
employment law due to temporary visa status and who are willing to accept low wages 
and poor working conditions to earn money to support themselves or family overseas, but 
risk deportation or other legal immigration issues if they are not compliant (Baines, 2016). 
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In addition to this informal economy of care, in other marketised systems, in other 
countries, social policy has increasingly placed onus of care on unpaid carers (Foster et 
al., 2016). Unpaid work is often performed by female family members and often relies 
on the assumption that caring is natural for women (Baines, 2016). These blurred 
boundaries between paid and unpaid work reinforce a gendered undervaluation of care 
work (Macdonald, 2017). This “highly gendered, increasingly racialised and wholly 
classed phenomenon” (Baines, 2016, p. 197) of undervaluing the work of carers feeds 
social norms that contribute to underpaid work in this field and is becoming “more visible 
in the Australian context of disability support work” (Macdonald, Bentham & Malone, 
2018, p. 84). 
Systemic Issues Contributing to Poor Working Conditions 
In the context of marketisation and the NDIS we can see that “New Public Management 
and managerialism reframe paid, formal care work as an endeavour that can be taylorised 
and rationalized, and increasingly paid at austere and constrained levels” (Baines, 2016, 
p. 207). This issue needs to be considered within the context of the system that has led 
organisations to adopt these harsh conditions. The Productivity Commission have made 
clear that the NDIS market relies on providers being able to innovatively provide care at 
lower costs. To achieve this, agencies have adopted managerialist principles in service 
delivery. The consequent result is that low-cost services are delivered through 
deteriorating wages and job quality for care workers (Macdonald, 2017). Uncertain, 
inadequate funding has a direct impact on organisations being able to attract and retain 
staff and in turn, poor pay is linked with high staff turnover and poor service delivery 
(Clancey & Westcott, 2017). 
In the context of the NDIS, there is an absence of legal responsibility on lead 
organisations who are not direct employers, but who control how jobs are conceptualised 
and constructed (Macdonald et al., 2018). They contend that their findings “support the 
view that the NDIS is further institutionalising employment practices that produce wages 
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underpayment” (Macdonald et al., 2018, p. 93). Recent research suggests that prices set 
by NDIS are set too low to allow providers to pay their staff at minimum award rates 
(Macdonald et al., 2018). It is important to consider the systemic issues of funding and 
policy that are contributing to low-paid, low-quality work under the NDIS. 
Impact on Service Users  
Proponents of the NDIS highlight the strength of individualised budgets to empower 
service users to exercise choice and control over the services they receive and positions 
them as active consumers who can decide how and when to spend their money to suit 
their needs (Dickinson et al., 2014). Whether these personalised models of care actually 
offer improvements for consumers is a matter of debate (Carey et al., 2017). Despite 
negative media coverage about the NDIS, 84 per cent of participants reported they were 
satisfied with their NDIS experience in 2016-2017 and between 40-45 per cent of 
participants believed they had more choice and control over services and providers (Gurd 
et al., 2018). However, it has also been argued that personalising funding does not 
automatically equate to equitable, quality services and “there has been a trade-off between 
equity and efficiency” of support (Carey et al., 2018, p. 401). It has also been suggested 
that passion for individualised funding models is, in fact, overtaking the evidence in this 
area (Needham, 2010). This is because personalisation brings together economic logic, 
as well as notions of disability activism and is hence very attractive to policy-makers. 
However, there is actually little evidence that personalisation is bringing about better 
outcomes for clients (Carey et al., 2018).  
Choice and Control 
While the NDIS focuses on providing participants with increased choice and control in 
their lives, scholars argue that the association between consumer choice and personal 
power is complex and question whether increased ‘choice’ really equates with ‘control’ 
(Fawcett & Plath, 2014). Indeed, individuals hold different capacities to exercise choice 
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and control, whether in intellectual capacity or social capacity (Carey et al, 2017). For 
example, a person living with an intellectual disability who has a supportive informal 
network will find it easier to self-manage their funds over a person with the same 
disability who is socially isolated. In this way, individualised budgets can, in fact, widen 
inequities between people with different types of disability (Carey et al., 2017).  
Furthermore, choice-making within a market carries systemic issues because markets 
shape choice by the very options they present to consumers (Fawcett & Plath, 2014). In 
some contexts, the quality and accessibility of services may in fact make ‘consumer 
choice’ redundant. For example, the majority of NDIS providers will charge a minimum 
of one hour for services. So, an individual who wishes to travel to and from a day program 
that is twenty minutes from home will find it difficult to find an NDIS provider who will 
not over-charge them. In this case, the market excludes choice and control for the person 
with disability and in many cases like this, individuals would rely on informal or unpaid 
carers to fill this gap in service delivery. 
Moreover, choice and control for NDIS participants exists within the context of what is 
deemed ‘reasonable and necessary’ by the statutory agency appointed to implement the 
NDIS (the NDIA). While consumer decision making is at the forefront of the scheme’s 
design, the ultimate decision-making power comes from professionals using standardised 
tools to determine the scope of services available, the level of care required and the 
expectation of care from informal supports (Foster et al., 2016). This policy acts as a 
“gatekeeping process that protects limited government resources and offers 
accountability for the use of public funds” (Fawcett & Plath, 2014, p. 757). For example, 
under the NDIS, clients are allocated different pools of funding for different purposes and 
these pools are not interchangeable. For instance, if a participant’s insurance package 
includes a certain budget for equipment, these dollars cannot be used for therapy or social 
participation (NDIS, 2016).  
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In designing the NDIS the Productivity Commission has acknowledged these issues and 
offers the service of Support Coordinators and Local Area Coordinators as a strategy to 
counteract these challenges (Fawcett & Plath, 2014). However, workers filling these roles 
are subject to the same working conditions and intensification described earlier in this 
paper. Therefore ,opportunities to promote social justice in these roles is limited or 
usually occurs during unpaid time (Baines et al., 2014). 
Despite the rhetoric that claims empowerment for consumers in a marketised sector, there 
is no evidence that people with disabilities hold more power in society within a market-
driven system (Onyx et al., 2016). The NDIS does allow for “modest customisation” of 
service delivery (Needham & Dickinson, 2018, p. 734) but does not necessarily address 
structural and systemic barriers that are themselves disabling. To truly effect structural 
change, the sector would need to adopt a bottom-up, human-rights framework that 
decentralises power in society (Needham & Dickinson, 2018). However, with a scheme 
grounded in a market-led agenda, there is a real possibility that a neoliberal economic 
focus will continue to dominate over a human-rights based model (Fawcett & Plath, 
2014). 
Regressing or Entrenching Inequality  
While individualised budgets have the potential to enhance empowerment for consumers, 
they also have the ability to widen existing social inequalities. Early evidence indicates 
that this is a real risk for the NDIS and bears the question as to whether a market-driven 
sector can deliver equitable services to all participants (Carey et al., 2017). People can be 
marginalised from accessing organisations and services for a variety of reasons, for 
example: historical, cultural, logistical, environmental, mental health, communication 
difficulties and complexity of needs (Fawcett & Plath, 2014). Within an open market, 
competition can reproduce underlying structures of marginalisation (Spies-Butcher, 
2014). For example, when service providers compete to deliver services, there is a risk 
that they will ‘cherry-pick’ clients who have the greatest capacity to pay and the least 
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expensive support needs, and exclude or dis-service participants with complex needs 
(Green & Mears, 2014). This problem of unequal access becomes even more widespread 
when clients can supplement profits by payments for service (Spies-Butcher, B. (2014).  
As outlined earlier, choice-making is a complex process that can be shaped by the market 
itself. Despite the notion of choice for consumers, marketised systems may disadvantage 
consumers whose access is limited by the market choices available to them. A ‘thin 
market’ can occur when there are not enough providers in a market for it to function as 
intended and can lead to market failure (Carey et al., 2017). It is easy to imagine how 
market failure or thin markets are likely to occur in regions outside major cities for people 
with complex needs (Carey et al., 2017). In these situations, marketising social care can 
be seen as widening social inequality and entrenching systems of disadvantage for 
communities that are under-resourced.  
Designing a social care system based on neoliberal principles creates markets where 
marginalised groups of people enter into a free-market to receive services. With this basis, 
it is not surprising that outcomes are likely to reflect structural disadvantages that are 
evident in other free-market systems (Fawcett & Plath, 2014). Cary and Crammond 
(2017, p. 306) summarise: “choice-based models can create economic, social and racially 
stratified communities because they depend on market-based approaches which, 
ultimately produce winners and losers”.  
Conclusion 
Marketising social care is a contentious and complex topic. This is demonstrated in the 
way that market-based social policies have driven organisational change in Australia and 
how this affects workers and care recipients. Reviewing current literature about 
Australia’s NDIS policy implementation, this paper has mapped out how neoliberal 
economic principles have been spread through social policy, inadvertently eroding a 
strong care ethic and professional identity in the social welfare sector. Organisations have 
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adopted styles of New Public Management to compete within the market which has 
resulted in work intensification, standardisation and deskilling of the workforce. These 
results have flow-on effects for the provision of poor-quality care for consumers. These 
issues have been examined within the context of the NDIS and its provision of disability 
care using individualised funding packages within an open-market.  
The NDIS purports empowerment for people living with disability by offering increased 
choice and control over the services they receive and positions them as active consumers 
that purchase services within the open-market. This paper acknowledges the strengths of 
this approach, in hope of a more socially equitable system for people with disabilities. 
However, it critically analyses a market-led approach to service provision and highlights 
issues that arise relating to working conditions and quality of care within this system. 
This essay has also questioned the effectiveness of marketised services to provide 
equitable support to marginalised groups and considered whether the NDIS is truly 
offering empowerment to participants. 
As the scheme rolls out, the challenge for the NDIS will be whether policy-makers can 
adopt a bottom-up, rights-based perspective that informs regulation of the market and 
decentralises power to address social inequality. Without this perspective, there is a very 
real risk that the rhetoric of empowerment, choice and control for consumers will be 
merely “inclusive window dressing” (Fawcett & Plath, 2014, p. 760) for policies that 
support government control and economic outcomes.  
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